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Rapid Innovation with Chinese Characteristics: National 
Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response 
Teams and the Military-Civil Fusion Innovation Ecosystem 
Emily de La Bruyère—is a Co-Founder of Horizon Advisory, a geopolitical consultancy, as well as a 
Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Her work focuses on China’s 
standardization ambitions, military–civil fusion strategy, and platform geopolitics, as well as their 
implications for global security and the economic order. She holds a Bachelor of Arts summa cum laude 
from Princeton University and a Master of Arts summa cum laude from Sciences Po, Paris, where she 
was the Michel David-Weill fellow. (ebde@alumni.princeton.edu) 
Abstract 
To respond to China’s military–civil fusion (MCF) strategy, the United States needs a prioritization 
framework. The United States must determine what technologies to protect and capabilities to 
develop. These determinations must be informed by U.S. goals, accounting for relative strengths 
and weaknesses. The determinations must also be informed by the adversary: how China 
operates, to what ends, and with what resources.  
This paper leverages the technological demands of China’s National Defense Science and 
Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams in order to begin to address those questions—
and to provide an example of the sort of data sets that might be used to answer them more 
comprehensively moving forward. Beijing’s MCF innovation ecosystem clearly prioritizes 
information technology, broadly. More specifically, entities charged with fusing commercial and 
military innovation appear to prioritize autonomous systems (e.g., UAVs, UUVs), sensing and 
network technologies to dock into and connect them, and information aggregation and analysis 
platforms. Advanced algorithms and software do not feature prominently in the surveyed data set. 
These findings can inform U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition. Defensively, Beijing’s 
priorities and commercial dependencies should shape the DoD’s efforts to protect. Offensively, 
the insight this data provides into Chinese capabilities can assist U.S. efforts to identify and 
exploit weaknesses.  
Introduction 
We no longer require National Defense Strategies to signal that the United States and 
China are locked in a great power competition. And Beijing’s military–civil fusion (军民融合; 
MCF) strategy—once a niche, technical concept reserved for fora like this one—has become a 
widely recognized component of today’s great power contest (de La Bruyere & Picarsic, 2019). 
Discussion of MCF appears everywhere from U.S. policy documents to mainstream media 
coverage (e.g., Swanson, 2020). With this growing awareness of MCF comes growing 
awareness of the strategic asymmetries it portends, namely Beijing’s ability to weaponize its 
integration into the international commercial ecosystem both to obtain resources and project 
power.  
This diagnosis of the United States–China competition, and the role of MCF within it, is 
long overdue. Yet however accurate, broad diagnosis neither ensures an appropriate strategic 
response to China’s challenge nor resolves the asymmetries of Beijing’s competitive approach. 
MCF entails the integration of military and civilian resources, actors, and positioning for the sake 
of comprehensive, and international, power. The strategy is designed to take advantage of the 
twin trends of information technology and globalization. With innovation flowing relatively freely 
across national borders, Beijing siphons advanced research and development from abroad in 
order to bolster its own military and economic apparatus (de La Bruyere, 2020). In a world 
dependent on multinational supply chains, Beijing develops positions of relative control over key 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 142 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
nodes within them—and then converts that control into coercive leverage (Bradsher, 2010). As 
international systems come to depend on information and its flow, Beijing works not only to 
collect superior information but also to build and to control emerging global information 
infrastructures (e.g., telecommunications, digital payment systems, surveillance networks). 
Beijing does so across military and commercial domains, for fused military and commercial 
advantage (de La Bruyere & Picarsic, 2020). 
There is no easy response to China’s approach. The U.S. commercial sector innovates, 
including in dual-use domains. That innovation circulates relatively freely at home and abroad. 
Washington can neither stop such circulation nor move domestic innovation into the isolated 
confines of government operations. Nor can Washington re-shore, or allied-shore, all supply 
chains over which China might exert coercive leverage—or match Beijing point for point in all 
emerging infrastructures everywhere.  
Rather, the United States must prioritize. In military as well as in commercial and civilian 
competition, Washington will have to develop a prioritization framework—of what technologies 
to protect, what resources and manufacturing capabilities to develop, and through what 
infrastructures to compete. That framework should be derived from U.S. goals, factoring in U.S. 
strengths and weaknesses, including relative standing vis-à-vis China. The framework must also 
take into account the adversary’s framework—how China operates, to what ends, and with what 
resources—including 
 
• those technologies and applications that Beijing prioritizes for the emerging great power 
competition; 
• those technologies for which Beijing relies on the civilian sector; and 
• those actors within the Chinese system that play the most critical roles in the process.  
 
These are large questions but not impossible ones. Reliable open-source indicators exist 
to benchmark comparative analysis and map out answers. This paper leverages one data set in 
particular: technological demands of China’s National Defense Science and Technology 
Innovation Rapid Response Teams since 2018. This data set by no means reflects the entirety 
of the MCF innovation ecosystem. Neither it nor the analysis presented in this paper is 
exhaustive. Rather, they are offered as examples of the sort of open-source data, and analysis 
of it, that can fuel the requisite understanding of Beijing’s systems and priorities.  
The Rapid Response Team data set suggests that the MCF innovation ecosystem 
places particular emphasis on information-related technologies and applications. Among notable 
examples, those include autonomous vehicles—for air, ground, and maritime deployment—as 
well as the sensing and network capabilities to be docked into them. They also, and perhaps 
most significantly, include networks or platforms through which collected information can be 
integrated and analyzed. Those networks and platforms, and the power that they promise, apply 
to military as well as to civilian domains: MCF fuses both civilian and military inputs to develop 
outputs that are applied in traditional military domains. This much is already well documented in 
U.S. analysis. The MCF innovation effort, as reflected in this sample, also uses fused civilian 
and military inputs to develop outputs that are used to project power in civilian domains. These 
civilian domains those conventionally seen as cooperative rather than competitive. In other 
words, not only are military and civilian inputs to be fused, but military and civilian outputs are as 
well. 
National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams 
In 2018, the Science and Technology Committee of China’s Central Military Commission 
established the first National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response 
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Team, known as the Rapid Response Team. That team was based in Shenzhen (Office of the 
Military–Civil Fusion Development Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, 2018).1 Since, additional teams in Chongqing and Dalian have been 
established.  
These Rapid Response Teams might be thought of as the Chinese equivalents of the 
Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). As the Office of the Military-Civil Fusion Development 
Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the CCP puts it, the Rapid Response 
teams “link advanced commercial technologies and products to national defense capabilities.” 
Their main task is to “pay close attention to advanced commercial technologies, concepts, and 
models; actively discover and quickly respond to commercial technologies and products with 
military application potential; and build a bridge between the frontiers of military and commercial 
innovation” (Office of the Military–Civil Fusion Development Committee of the Shenzhen 
Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2018). To that end, the Rapid Response 
Teams 
• study advanced commercial technologies, monitoring new developments for applications 
to national security, including through monthly field research; 
• solicit fast, innovative commercial solutions based on national defense needs, generally 
with a 6-to-12-month timeline for delivery; and 
• use military-oriented demonstrations of technologies and their applications to build a 
communication platform for the military, innovative companies, innovative teams, and 
investment vehicles (Office of the Military–Civil Fusion Development Committee of the 
Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2018). 
 
Since 2018, the Rapid Response Teams have issued requests for at least 57 
technological solutions (see Appendix) and have organized at least six technology competitions 
or challenges (see Table 3). The technology solution requests tend to have timelines ranging 
from 6 to 12 months for delivery, with the exception of three directly related to COVID-19 
response, which call for 5- to 30-day turnaround. In some but not all cases, the technology 
solution requests state explicitly that the projects should “give priority to domestic materials, 
equipment and systems.”2 
This paper uses the set of requests and challenges as a proxy for assessing those 
technologies and applications around which China’s commercial-based MCF innovation efforts 
revolve and for identifying associated actors. Of course, the Rapid Response Teams and their 
projects do not reflect the entirety of China’s national defense science and technology project or 
the MCF apparatus. By any metric—funding, employees, projects—these constitute a relatively 
small program. However, they do exist at a ripe intersection of MCF and innovation. The insight 
they provide might not be exhaustive, but it is unusually valuable. 
Rapid Innovation with Chinese Characteristics 
The National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams’ 
technology requests and challenges reveal a decided focus on information-related technologies, 
namely autonomy and sensing. Nine of the Rapid Response Teams’ 57 known technology 
requests relate directly to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and another three relate to 
 
1 Shenzhen is considered China’s high-tech hub (see, for example, Borak & Xue, 2021).  
2 See, for example, the shipborne 3D printing intelligent rapid repair manufacturing technology and the 
high voltage, high current pulse inductor coil assembly projects. 
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unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).3 Those are matched by a similar number of requests 
for sensing and network capabilities that could be docked into them. Maritime examples include 
video-based maritime intelligent target recognition technology, shallow surface target detection 
technology, software-defined multifunctional sonar, environmental perception adaptive 
underwater acoustic mobile ad hoc network technology, and underwater distributed optical fiber 
sensing technology. Advanced algorithms and software do not feature prominently in this data 
set. That may be a function of information availability (e.g., stricter confidentiality protocols 
around their development) or time frame (i.e., they may require more lead time and therefore 
not fall under the purview of rapid innovation). The gap could also reflect a difference in 
prioritization (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1. Rapid Response Teams Requests and Challenges, by Technology Focus 







Operations and Maintenance 1 
Flight 1 
 
Table 2. Rapid Response Teams Requests and Challenges, by Domain Focus 
Domain  Project Count 
Maritime 16 
Air 14 
Energy  7 
Advanced Materials 6 
Ground 6 
Information Space 6 
COVID-19 4 
Electronics and Circuits 4 
 
Across the board, regardless of the focus domain or technology, the data set reveals an 
emphasis on information collection, integration, and operationalization. This emphasis is evident 
in the host of technology requests focused on autonomy and sensing (e.g., video-based 
maritime intelligent target recognition technology). The emphasis is even more evident in the 
Rapid Response Teams’ technology challenges.  
 
3 In what might reflect an asymmetry of technological approach, the technological requirements for one of 
these projects, the “hand-thrown micro aircraft,” requested in January 2020, note that the communication 
module should “later provide the connection function with the 5G communication network.”  
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Table 3. Rapid Response Team Challenges: 2018–2020 
Date Name Additional Organizing Entities Description 
Dec 
2018 
Exoskeleton quick sprint 
project 
- Execution period of 3 years (2018.12 ~ 2021.12); carried out in 
three 12-month stages, including two application sprints (6 




Remote Sensing Data 
Intelligent Processing 
Algorithm Competition 
Harbin Institute of Technology (Shenzhen); Aerospace 
Dongfanghong Satellite Co.; Changchun Institute of 
Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (Chinese 
Academy of Sciences); Shenzhen Pusheng Intelligent 
Technology Co.; Zhuhai Orbit Aerospace Technology 
Co.; China Yuan Jinxin (Dalian) Information 
Technology Co. 
Promote the development of massive optical remote sensing 
satellite data processing technology, aim at in-orbit applications, 
and support the realization of massive remote sensing data 









National Defense Science and Technology Innovation 
Special Zone Expert Group, National Space Science 
Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute 
of Automation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.  
Focus on detection and recognition needs of ground targets in 
complex urban scenes through algorithm performance 
comparison tests based on real-environment video data sets; 
the goal is to enhance the intelligent recognition and real-time 






National Defense Technology Innovation Special Zone 
Expert Group  
Focus on the needs of security prevention and control in the 
core area of the city and the detection and identification of 
ground threats, as well as to promote and lead the innovative 
development of the AI security field; the goal is to select new 
solutions for intelligent image/video analysis in natural 










National Defense Technology Innovation Special Zone 
Expert Group, China Academy of Ordnance Science, 
PLA Army Research Institute, Chongqing High-Tech 
Zone Feima Innovation Research Institute, Chongqing 
University of Technology, China Ordnance Industry 
Testing Research Institute, Chongqing Science and 
Technology Bureau 
Based on large-scale activities in the urban environment, 
explore the multi-scenario, multi-node dynamic communication 
group in the urban environment based on the complex 
geographic environment, electromagnetic environment, and 
dynamic movement of people in the city.  
Jan 
2020 
Accurate Aerial Docking 
Technology of “Range 
Go” UAV Challenge 
National Defense Technology Innovation Zone Expert 
Group, China Aerospace Science and Industry 
Corporation, The Third Institute of Aerospace Science 
and Technology of China, China Electronics 
Technology Group Corporation Electronic Science 
Research Institute, Shanghai Jiaotong University, 
University of Electronic Science and Technology, 
Xidian University, Yuanwang Think Tank, Shanxi 
Datong Aviation Sports School 
This challenge focuses on the drone aerial docking process, 
including precise flight control of drones against aerodynamic 
interference, precise identification and tracking of docking 
points, the efficient approach strategy for air pre-docking, and 
collision avoidance and obstacle avoidance technology. 
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Of the six known challenges held since December 2018, four revolve around information 
collection, processing, and analysis, and a fifth on aerial docking of UAVs (see Table 3). A host 
of other entities cooperate with the Rapid Response Teams in organizing those challenges, 
suggesting a breadth of data types, collection methods, and applications—as well as of 
players—involved in the MCF information innovation process. For example, the organizing 
entities for the January 2020 Unlimited Smart Communication Challenge span military, 
industrial, academic, and government units. They include the China Academy of Ordnance 
Science and China Ordnance Industry Testing Research Institute, both of which exist under 
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO), one of China’s centrally state-owned 
defense industry conglomerates; the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Army Research 
Institute; the Chongqing High-Tech Zone Feima Innovation Research Institute (重庆高新区飞马
创新研究院), a research institute dedicated to the development of dual-use technology and 
housed within a MCF-focused industry zone (Chongqing University Graduate Employment 
Information Network, n.d.); as well as the Chongqing University of Technology and the 
Chongqing Science and Technology Bureau (National Defense Science and Technology 
Innovation Rapid Response Team [Shenzhen], 2020). 
That 2020 Unlimited Smart Communication Challenge also points to another core aspect 
of the MCF information project reflected in the Rapid Response Team data set: These requests 
and competitions do not simply entail converting civilian inputs to military use cases. They also 
suggest an effort to use civilian outputs to project military-relevant power. The 2020 Unlimited 
Smart Communication Challenge revolved around using flexible broadband communication and 
dynamic networking capabilities in an urban environment. Participating teams connected 
competition equipment—distributed in buildings, across city blocks, and in underground 
passages—to a test access platform; their scores were determined by video and voice 
transmission capability as well as average transmission delay. (National Defense Science and 
Technology Innovation Rapid Response Team [Shenzhen], 2020). This contest took place in a 
civilian environment, leveraging commercial technology, but was organized by military entities 
under the mandate of national defense innovation.  
The Ground Sentinel Challenge, also held in 2020, tells a similar story. The Rapid 
Response Team’s description of the competition describes it as “focusing on the needs of 
security prevention and control in the core area of the city and the detection and identification of 
ground threats.” Accordingly, the challenge revolved around intelligent video and image analysis 
solutions in “natural surveillance scenarios” to “promote the rapid development of smart security 
technology” for urban areas. Goals included unconstrained face recognition, suspicious object 
recognition, and dangerous behavior recognition. In determining the participating entities, 
priority was given to applicants who had past histories of supporting national ministry and 
provincial security systems (National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid 
Response Team, 2020). This contest, too, took place in a civilian environment, focused on 
civilian subjects, leveraging commercial technology. 
This blurred line between national defense innovation and civilian-focused applications is 
by no means surprising. It underlines a critical nuance of China’s MCF strategy. MCF is not only 
about fusing military and civilian inputs for the sake of Beijing’s power projection—using 
commercial UAV technologies in military operations, for example. The MCF project also fuses 
military and civilian outputs, whether industrial positioning or technological applications, in order 
to bolster China’s power projection. In this data set, China’s smart city technology, information 
collection, and control stands out as a ripe example. The point applies more broadly, especially 
across emerging infrastructures, networks, and platforms (de La Bruyere, 2020b). 
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The Rapid Response Teams’ technological requests also point to the other direction in 
which MCF can work: transfer of resources from the military to the civilian. Four of the requests 
issued in 2020 focus on technologies to be used in COVID-19 response, ranging from personal 
protective equipment to UAVs for operation in areas affected by the epidemic (see Table 4). 
Perhaps the most interesting element of these requests is their timeline: The vast majority of 
other technological requests call for delivery within a 12-month window. The shortest time frame 
for non–COVID-19 relevant technological requests, appearing only on three occasions, is 6 
months. However, three of the four COVID-19 relevant requests call for delivery in a matter of 
days, including as few as 5. These requests provide an example of Defense Production Act–like 
Chinese acquisition. They also suggest the timing with which such rapid acquisition might take 
place.  
 
Table 4. COVID-19 Relevant Technology Requests 
Date Request Timeline 
(months)  
1/30/20 Research on the prediction of the spread of harmful microorganisms 6 
2/8/20 Emergency operation UAV in epidemic area >1 (5 days) 
2/11/20 A batch disinfection system for personal protective equipment that 
can be quickly deployed 
>1 (30 
days) 
2/11/20 Protective clothing that can be re-sterilized and used >1 (20 
days) 
 
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Acquisition 
An appropriate response to the asymmetric threat of China’s MCF strategy will require a 
prioritization framework. The United States, and the U.S. acquisition system, will have to 
determine what technologies to protect, what resources and manufacturing capabilities to 
develop, and through what infrastructures to compete. Those determinations must be informed 
by U.S. goals, factoring in U.S. strengths and weaknesses—what is effective and ineffective, 
efficient and inefficient in the U.S. system.  
The determinations must also be informed by the adversary—by how China operates, to what 
ends, and with what resources. The United States must understand 
• those technologies and applications that Beijing prioritizes for the great power 
competition; 
• those technologies and applications for which Beijing relies on the civilian sector; and 
• those actors within the Chinese system that play the most critical roles in the process.  
This paper leverages the technological demands of China’s National Defense Science 
and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams in order to begin to answer those 
questions—and to provide an example of the sort of data sets, and analysis, that might be used 
to answer them more comprehensively moving forward. This single data set and this paper’s 
findings are only one piece of the overall puzzle. Still, direct implications emerge for an 
adversary-informed prioritization framework. 
• Beijing’s MCF innovation ecosystem clearly prioritizes information technology, broadly. 
• More specifically, entities charged with fusing commercial and military cutting-edge 
technology appear to prioritize autonomous systems (e.g., UAVs, UUVs), sensing and 
network technologies to dock into and connect them, and information aggregation and 
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analysis platforms more specifically. Advanced algorithms and software do not feature 
prominently in this data set. That may be a function of information availability (e.g., 
stricter confidentiality protocols around their development) or time frame (i.e., they may 
require more lead time and, therefore, not fall under the purview of rapid innovation). 
The gap could also reflect a difference in prioritization. 
• The MCF innovation ecosystem relies on participation and support from a range of 
government, industrial, and academic players, both military and civilian—local 
governments as well as military organs; state-owned defense industry conglomerates 
(e.g., NORINCO) as well as private, commercial companies (e.g., Shenzhen Pusheng 
Intelligent Technology Co., a subsidiary of Guangzhou Hengchuang Intelligent 
Technology Co.); state and military research institutes (e.g., the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences) as well as universities. 
These findings can directly inform DoD acquisition processes. Defensively, the DoD 
might take particular efforts to protect those technological areas that Beijing both focuses on 
and leverages the commercial sector in developing. Defensive measures can include screening 
of commercial DoD partners (e.g., Small Business Innovation Research [SBIR] applicants). 
Defensive measures can also include more systemic efforts, like the Trusted Capital Program. 
The DoD might also use the taxonomy of players contributing to MCF innovation efforts to 
inform monitoring of, and restrictions on, Chinese entities, including expansion of the companies 
identified under Section 1237 of the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act and 
corresponding actions. More offensively, these findings—and the more granular details of the 
technologies being requested and developed—might assist U.S. efforts to identify, and exploit, 
weaknesses of the Chinese defense apparatus.  
Today’s great power competition has been described as a technological race. Before we 
start running, let’s figure out where the finish line is. And how to stop our adversary from drafting 
off of us.  
Appendix. Rapid Response Team Technology Requests, 2018–2020 
Date Request Timeline 
(months) 
4/11/18 Conformal antenna and circuit integration rapid manufacturing technology 12 
4/11/18 High-pressure hydraulic control terminal control technology 12 
4/11/18 Video-based maritime intelligent target recognition technology 12 
4/11/18 High voltage, strong pulse current flexible coaxial cable 12 
4/11/18 High-precision, high-reliability, low-cost servo drive controller 12 
4/11/18 Intelligent human–computer interaction module 12 
4/11/18 Micro system heat sink 12 
7/24/18 Shipborne 3D printing “first aid kit” intelligent rapid repair manufacturing 
technology 
- 
6/3/19 Deepwater heavy-duty manipulator 12 
6/3/19 Deep water, high power density, high reliability, brushless propulsion motor 12 
10/15/19 Low-cost small air-to-surface missile technology - 
11/12/19 Low-cost small aircraft that can be deployed at high altitudes - 
11/12/19 High-altitude flying technology research - 
11/12/19 Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft dense and rapid deployment system - 
12/23/19 Self-protecting solder paste for high-reliability three-dimensional packaging - 
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12/23/19 0.6-inch high resolution silicon-based OLED microdisplay - 
12/23/19 Strong special-shaped tempered glass - 
12/23/19 Servo for high-overload low-cost missiles - 
12/23/19 Research on low-cost, high-temperature, infrared and low-radiation technology 
for vehicles 
- 
12/23/19 High rigidity and impact resistance precision reducer - 
1/7/20 Long-distance fishing net detection technology - 
1/7/20 Wide temperature semiconductor laser research - 
1/7/20 High voltage, high current pulse inductor coil assembly 6 
1/7/20 High-reliability DC brushless special motor with hollow cup - 
1/7/20 Anti-strong magnetic field and high overload DC brushless special motor - 
1/13/20 Integrated communication system and terminal for indoor distributed 
communication and positioning based on illumination light 
12 
1/13/20 Hand-thrown micro aircraft - 
1/21/20 Shallow surface target CT system 12 
1/21/20 Research on shallow surface target detection technology 6 
1/30/20 Research on the prediction of the spread of harmful microorganisms 6 
2/8/20 Emergency operation UAV in epidemic area >1 (5 
days) 




2/11/20 Protective clothing that can be re-sterilized and used >1 (20 
days) 
2/24/20 Software-defined multifunctional sonar 12 
2/24/20 Research on the preparation technology of ceramic-based material metal 
coating microstructure 
6 
3/9/20 “Low, slow, small” drone detection technology in urban complex environment 12 
3/9/20 “Low, slow, small” drone agile disposal technology in complex urban 
environment 
12 
3/9/20 “Low, slow, small” UAV link takeover technology in urban complex environment 12 
3/12/20 Development and application of on-site fatigue damage testing technology 
under extreme conditions 
- 
3/12/20 High-speed UUV near-field track electromagnetic passive measurement 
system 
12 
3/12/20 New aircraft anti-bird strike coating 12 
3/20/20 Formation collaborative navigation technology of underwater man-machine 
hybrid system 
12 
3/20/20 Environmental perception adaptive underwater acoustic mobile ad hoc network 
technology 
12 
3/20/20 Multi-domain and cross-media integrated communication and networking 
technology 
12 
3/20/20 Intelligent detection and recognition technology for typical targets of divers 12 
3/20/20 Smart diving mask integration optimization technology - 
3/26/20 UAV rapid obstacle avoidance technology 8 
3/26/20 UAV rapid target recognition and tracking technology 12 
3/26/20 Enhanced low-light scope 12 
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3/26/20 Personnel identification technology in dark environment 12 
4/16/20 Configurable RF chip 12 
4/16/20 Modular robot 12 
4/26/20 Underwater special connector 12 
4/26/20 Lightweight high-performance electromagnetic shielding paint 9 
4/30/20 Underwater distributed optical fiber sensing technology 12 
4/30/20 High-performance four-quadrant laser receiver components 12 
4/30/20 High-performance high-voltage DC/DC power supply module 10 
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